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1. Overview 
Conflict changes economic activity in a number of ways. This report looks at whether these 
changes in economic activity become entrenched after conflict has ended. The available 
evidence found within the scope of this report suggests that the extent to which changes in 
economic activity become entrenched after conflict depends on how developed a country was 
prior to conflict breaking out. Thus, the more developed a country was pre-conflict, the more 
quickly it is likely to recover economically after conflict.  
Specific economic challenges faced by countries during and after conflict include: 
Labour market issues: Conflict often causes an increase in unemployment and a rise in 
informal activities. These changes generally persist post conflict, due to a lack of opportunities, 
and due to job seekers having inappropriate skills for the jobs that are available. 
Illicit economic activities: Conflict tends to result in an increase in illicit economic activities. 
These illicit economic activities tend to continue post conflict, as those who have been profiting 
from them are reluctant to abandon lucrative sources of income. 
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Private sector decline: This often continues post conflict, due to skills shortages and problems 
with infrastructure, which make normal operations difficult. 
Capital flight: The flow of assets out of a country can reduce, continue, or be reversed post 
conflict. 
Small tax base: The rise in the informal sector during conflict, means that states emerging from 
conflict are left with a very small tax base. This, in turn, makes it difficult for the state to meet 
citizens’ basic needs and impedes the establishment of a stable system of governance. 
Inflation: The presence of international organisations and bilateral donors can generate inflation 
in post-conflict settings. 
Trade: During internal conflict, imports tend to reduce. However, after conflict trade often 
increases, with countries frequently experiencing a rise in exports. 
There is a relatively small body of English language literature on whether changes in economic 
activity during conflict become entrenched post conflict. The available literature consists of 
reports by international organisations, academic journal articles, and working papers. In terms of 
methodology used in the literature, there is a relatively even number of quantitative and 
qualitative studies. The literature considered in this review was largely gender-blind.  
2. Changes in economic activity during conflict 
According to UNDP, there are three types of war economy: 
 In combat economies ‘combat networks’ fill the gaps created by ‘destroyed social bonds 
and community-level exchanges’ (UNDP, 2008, pp. 38-39). Moreover, rent-generating 
wartime activities become one of the central features of conflict (UNDP, 2008, pp. 38-39). 
Elites tend to be the key players in such economies, but criminal profiteers and 
speculators are reportedly also involved (UNDP, 2008, pp. 38-39). In combat economies, 
the aforementioned elites tend to resort to corruption and criminality, including the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources. They are also sometimes engaged in the capture of 
diaspora remittances and aid flows. Armed groups use these revenues to fund and 
sustain conflict (2008, pp. 38-39) 
 Shadow economies are characterised by economic activities that take place outside 
state-regulated frameworks (UNDP, 2008, p. 39). They include, but go beyond, combat 
economies. The main actors in shadow economies are entrepreneurial elites who seek to 
profit from the mix of corruption, weak governance and porous borders created by 
conflict. They sometimes engage across enemy lines to make ‘lucrative commercial 
deals’ (UNDP, 2008, p. 39). 
 Coping economies encompass informal activities adopted as a means of coping and 
survival when government-provided services and employment in the formal sector are 
not available (UNDP, 2008, p. 39). Examples include the production of pots, furniture and 
tools, and the production, cooking and sale of food (UNDP, 2008, p. 39). 
3 
Labour market issues 
Conflict can have a negative impact on employment due to disrupted markets, lower levels of 
public spending, and a reduction in key imports for productive activities (UNDP, 2008, p. 40). 
Internal conflicts generally affect the demand side of labour markets, as private and public 
investment collapse. This results in high and persistent unemployment (UNDP, 2008, p. 40). 
Cross-border conflicts on the other hand generally affect the supply side (UNDP, 2008, p. 40). 
Conflict often results in a significant increase in informal activities. This is because people who 
have lost formal employment seek to survive through informal production and exchange (UNDP, 
2008, p. 40). 
Illicit economic activities 
According to UNDP, illicit economic activities tend to increase during conflict, as it ‘reduces the 
state’s power to regulate and increases opportunities for drug production and trade, smuggling 
and theft’ (2008, p. 37). 
Private sector decline 
The primary effects of internal conflict on firms include disruption of production through ‘the flight 
of employees, unreliability of transport, and fear of looting’ (Collier & Duponchel, 2010, p. 3). 
Firms reduce the size of their inventories due to these factors. The costs of this disruption ‘can 
be characterized as technical regress in the formal, private sector of the economy and so raise 
the unit cost of its output’ (Collier & Duponchel, 2010, p. 3). Firms are also affected by a 
reduction in demand. This is due to a reduction in incomes, especially cash incomes, as people 
move their assets abroad for safety, and move into informal subsistence activities (Collier & 
Duponchel, 2010, p. 3). 
Capital flight 
The effect of conflict on capital flight depends on the ‘nature, intensity and duration of the conflict’ 
(Davies, 2010, p. 3). In resource rich countries, primary commodities, such as diamonds, 
narcotics, or timber, can serve as vehicles for capital flight during conflict. Thus, in countries rich 
in natural resources that can be sold abroad relatively easily, the impact of violent conflict on 
capital flight can be much larger than in countries that lack natural resources (Davies, 2010, p. 
3). 
Trade 
Internal conflict tends to result in fewer imports, whereas cross-border conflict is not always 
associated with lower levels of imports (Marano et al, 2013, p. 218). This is because internal 
conflict is more likely to cause societal divisions and tensions, resulting in the destruction of both 
the physical and societal infrastructure that are vital for productive and trading activities (Marano 
et al, 2013, p. 218). Cross-border conflict on the other hand is less likely to seriously damage a 
country’s physical infrastructure and ‘societal fabric’ (Marano et al, 2013, p. 218).  
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3. Economic activity post conflict  
On average, post-conflict economies grow faster than normal as they quickly recover from the 
damage done during conflict (AfDB, 2009, p. 44). However, performance varies widely, with 
some post-conflict societies not undergoing rapid economic recovery. According to the African 
Development Bank, this variability suggests that performance during the post-conflict period is 
particularly sensitive to policy choices (2009, p. 44). A peer-reviewed academic journal article 
finds that rapid recovery occurs in the more-developed post-conflict societies, but that the 
consequences of conflict last far longer and are more severe in less- and least-developed 
societies (Kugler et al, p. 8). Moreover, Gates et al find that even where there is rapid economic 
growth post conflict, economic performance will vary across sectors (2012, p. 1720). They argue 
that the most likely reason for rapid economic recovery is international assistance (Gates et al, 
2012, p. 1720). The presence of international organisations and bilateral donors in post conflict 
settings can also hinder economic recovery. Tying aid to donor goods and services rather than 
stimulating the local economy through local procurement, and a tendency to ‘substitute for 
instead of relying upon and building local capacities’ are examples of ways in which aid can 
impede economic recovery (Manning & Trzeciak-Duval, 2010, p. 110). 
Combat and shadow economies complicate economic recovery after war in several ways: 
 They can limit the opportunities for policy change after conflict. Those who profit from war 
are often also those who ‘won’ the conflict. Therefore, they can use the wealth and power 
they have accumulated during conflict to influence the terms of peace agreements, or to 
undermine agreements that they believe will not serve their interests (UNDP, 2008, p. 
39). 
 Ex-fighters often become part of transitional governments and are responsible for 
overseeing post conflict economic recovery. However, according to UNDP, ‘transparent 
fiscal systems, economic justice or other reforms aimed at promoting general welfare and 
national economic recovery, are not always in their interests’ (2008, p. 39). 
 Post-conflict governing elites often have access to large volumes of ‘ill-gotten profits,’ 
which far exceed donor funding. This reduces donor leverage for reform (UNDP, 2008, p. 
39). 
 The continuation of combat and shadow economies can make it difficult for states to 
mobilise tax and customs revenues (see also section on taxation). Not only do they 
undermine revenue capabilities, they also reduce the financing available to the state to 
rebuild infrastructure and improve social service provision (UNDP, 2008, p. 39). 
Labour market issues  
Very high unemployment and under-employment tend to persist long after conflict has ended 
(UNDP, 2008, p. 40). Post conflict, there are often limited jobs and those that are available 
generally pay less than conflict-related work. Moreover, job seekers’ skills are often poorly suited 
to post-conflict rebuilding needs (UNDP, 2008, p. 40). Youth unemployment is often a particular 
problem, as post-conflict countries tend to have a large proportion of young people. Young men 
who return from war and cannot find employment may end up participating in illicit economic 
activities or take up arms again, either in their home country or in a neighbouring country (UNDP, 
2008, p. 40). Even those who manage to find employment can suffer reduced purchasing power 
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due to the high inflation rates that are sometimes experienced by conflict economies (UNDP, 
2008, p. 40). International organisations and bilateral donors can exacerbate the situation by 
depriving the local economy of qualified professionals who choose to work as well paid drivers of 
donor agencies over working as poorly paid government officials (Manning & Trzeciak-Duval, 
2010, p. 110). 
Subsistence farming and forestry and fishery enterprises are often severely affected by conflict. 
This is due to the disruption or destruction of transport and communications networks, and due to 
farm workers fleeing for safety, or to join government or insurgent military units. Women stopping 
tending their fields for fear of attacks by soldiers, also has a negative impact on farming (UNDP, 
2008, p. 40). 
According to a UNDP report, the informal sector in the post-conflict economy tends to be larger 
than in developing countries not affected by conflict. Moreover, it tends to work differently and 
benefit different people (2008, p. 38). A large informal economy results in a smaller tax base (see 
section on taxation) (International Peace Academy, 2003, p. 10).  
One peer reviewed journal article discusses the impact of demographics on labour market issues 
in post conflict settings. The article argues that post conflict baby booms increase the productivity 
of more-developed societies, as they have been able to preserve the human capital that was 
acquired by previous generations (Kugler et al, pp. 8-9). It goes on to argue that as a result, 
these countries’ young populations can out-produce, with newer equipment, their ‘less-
devastated, most-developed competitors’ (Kugler et al, pp. 8-9). However, in the least-developed 
societies, baby booms increase the number of low skilled young people. In these cases, 
population recovery means that the economic losses incurred during conflict are preserved. 
These countries lose recently acquired human capital, and are unable to educate their youth, 
even to pre-war levels (Kugler et al, pp. 8-9). The authors suggest that in such cases foreign aid 
may be the determining factor between rapid economic recovery and stagnation (Kugler et al, pp. 
8-9). 
Illicit economic activities 
According to Brown ‘the availability of easy money in the form of illicit commodity trade and 
exports has systemic effects for those countries coming out of conflict’ (2006, p. 9). Those who 
have benefited economically from conflict, including from sanctions regimes, aim to consolidate 
their power once conflict has ended (International Peace Academy, 2003, p. 10). They do this by 
increasing their control over the local economy and political processes. ‘Economic criminality is 
difficult to root out, not only because criminal networks are highly adaptive, but also because of 
the vital economic and social functions that they have often come to serve’ (International Peace 
Academy 2003, p. 10). 
Private sector decline 
The decline in the private sector experienced in many post conflict settings is closely linked to the 
labour market issues discussed above. Conflict induced technical regress causes a reduction in 
output in response to a decline in demand, which in turn leads to a contraction of the labour 
force. The decline in employment then results in a loss of skills for the part of the labour force 
that loses employment (Collier & Duponchel, 2010, p. 4). Technical regress is reportedly 
characterised by a return to production practices that would be deemed inefficient in times of 
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peace. Collier & Duponchel provide the example of an absence of electricity forcing workers to 
switch to manual operations (2010, p. 25). They argue that ‘in effect, [employees] learn 
reversionary techniques which peace will make redundant, and forget techniques which peace 
will again make feasible and superior’ (2010, p. 25). This issue is reportedly only a problem in 
post-conflict settings, because firms that have adjusted to the conditions of conflict, find 
themselves unable to cope post conflict. This is due to the fact that while demand increases and 
they would be in a position to abandon the reversionary technologies, there is now a lack of 
skilled labour. Firms in conflict-affected areas must therefore manage with lower quality workers 
and are therefore less productive (Collier & Duponchel, 2010, p. 4).  
Construction sector 
A diminished construction sector, due to fewer construction companies and a lack of skilled 
workers, slows post conflict economic recovery. It also results in booms in construction prices 
due to increased demand and limited supply. These price booms result in increased spending 
due to higher costs, and generate large ‘rents’ for those who control supply. This in turn creates 
space for political corruption (AfDB, 2009, p. 45). 
Trade 
A quantitative study published by the IMF finds that trade is the most influential determinant of 
economic growth in post conflict settings (David et al, 2011, p. 23). Post-conflict situations are 
often linked to commodity export booms. This is the result of ‘quantity effects, as production 
increases due to the resumption of normal operations and increases in investment, and positive 
price effects’ (David et al, 2011, p. 23). Possible reasons for this include the fact that 
governments are in a better position to renegotiate the terms of extraction; possibly because 
more firms are willing to compete for extraction rights as political uncertainty reduces, leading to 
increased competition for such rights (David et al, 2011, p. 23). 
 Capital flight 
Capital flight that occurs during conflict may reduce, continue, or be reversed post- war (Davies, 
2010, p. 4). The end of conflict can lead to a reduction in capital flight by decreasing political risks 
and by providing high-return investment opportunities in the domestic economy (Davies, 2010, p. 
4). However, fears of a return to conflict could keep perceived risks high. Perceived risks are 
likely to reduce the longer peace endures (Davies, 2010, p. 4). According to the AfDB, whether or 
not capital flight continues is critical to economic recovery because the stock of assets held 
overseas is often very large relative to the economy  (2009, p. 45). Reasons for continued capital 
flight may be: 
 The process of moving assets abroad during the conflict had not been completed (AfDB, 
2009, p. 45). 
 New wealth, resulting from high profits post conflict, is being moved abroad due to 
concerns about further insecurity or conflict (AfDB, 2009, p. 45).  
However, the above is not always the case. Uganda reportedly succeeded in attracting 
‘substantial human and financial capital repatriation’ during the first ten years after conflict ended 
(AfDB, 2009, p. 45).  
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Small tax base 
Taxation may be particularly expensive in post-conflict settings because during prolonged conflict 
most economic activity takes place within the informal sector, resulting in a smaller tax base 
(AfDB, 2009, p. 47). This undermines the ability of states emerging from conflict to fund the 
provision of basic goods and services, most importantly security, to undertake needed 
reconstruction projects, and to establish viable institutions of governance (AfDB, 2009, p. 47). 
While post conflict foreign aid can help to bridge this gap, this is not a sustainable way of 
financing the state. The state’s failure to provide basic services, and their provision by criminal or 
shadow networks, reportedly undermines the establishment of the ‘social contract’ required for 
‘stable and accountable governance’ (International Peace Academy, 2003, p. 10). 
Inflation 
Conflict often results in a high rate of inflation (AfDB, 2009, p. 47). The presence of international 
organisations and bilateral donors in post conflict settings can be one of the causes of this 
(Manning & Trzeciak-Duval, 2010, p. 110). 
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